Mathematical Economics

Topics are

• Abstract Economies
• Equilibrium
• Applications of Fixed Point Theorems
• Common Knowledge
• Rationality
• Utility
• Preferences
• Fuzzy Preferences
• Social Choice
• Fuzzy Social Choice
• Computational Economics

\begin{equation}{\label{a}}\tag{A}\mbox{}\end{equation}

Abstract Economies.

\item Aliprantis, C.D., Florenzano, M., Martins-da-Rocha, V.F. and Tourky, R.:
Equilibrium Analysis in Financial Markets with Countably Many Securities,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 40 (2004) 683-699.

\item Aliprnatis, C.D., Florenzano, M. and Tourky, R.:
General Equilibrium Analysis in Ordered Topological Vector Spaces,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 40 (2004) 247-269.

\item Bonnisseau, J.-M.:
Regular Economies with Non-Ordered Preferences,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 39 (2003) 153-174.

\item Cornet, B., Topuzu, M. and Yildiz, A.:
Equilibrium Theory with a Measure Space of Possibly Satiated Consumers,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 39 (2003) 175-196.

\item Gottardi,P. and Kajii, A.:
A Note on the Regularity of Competitive Equlibria and Asset Structures,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 39 (2003) 763-776.

\item Lin, L.-J. and Ansari:
Collective Fixed Points and Maximal Elements with Applications to Abstract
Economies,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications} 296 (2004) 455-472.

\item Ma, J. and Nie, F.:
Walrasian Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy with Indivisibilities,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 46 (2993) 159-192.

\item Martins-da-Rocha, V.F.:
Equilibria in Large Economies with a Separable Banach Commodity Space and
Non-Ordered Preferences,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 39 (2003) 863-889.

\item McLean, R. and Postlewaite, A.:
Core Convergence with Asymmetric Information,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 50 (2005) 58-78.

\item Podczeck, K.:
On COre-Walras Equivalence in Banach Spaces when Feasibility is Defined by
the Pettis Integral,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 40 (2004) 429-463.

\item Wang, L., Cho, Y.J. and Huangc, N.-J., (E-Article)
The Robustness of Generalized Abstract Fuzzy Economies in Generalized Convex Spaces
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 176 (2011) 56-63.

\item Zigrand, J.-P.:
A General Equilibrium Analysis of Stragetic Arbitrage,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 40 (2004) 923-952.

\begin{equation}{\label{b}}\tag{B}\mbox{}\end{equation}

Equilibrium.

\item Abreu, D.:
Extremal Equilibria of Oligopolistic Supergames,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 39 (1986) 191-225.

\item Akdeniz, L.:
Risk and Return in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model,
{\em Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control} 24 (2000) 1079-1096.

\item Aliprantis, C.D., Cornet, B. and Toruky, R.:
Economic Equilibrium: Optimality and Price Decentralization,
{\em Positivity} 6 (2002) 205-241.

\item Aliprnatis, C.D., Florenzano, M. and Tourky, R.:
General Equilibrium Analysis in Ordered Topological Vector Spaces,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 40 (2004) 247-269.

\item Aliprantis, C.D., Tourky, R. and Yannelis, N.C.:
The Riesz-Kantorovich Formula and General Equilibrium Theory,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 34 (2000) 55-76.

\item Aliprantis, C.D., Tourky, R. and Yannelis, N.C.:
A Theory of Value with Non-linear Prices: Equilibrium Analysia beyond Vector Lattices,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 100 (2001) 22-72.

\item Allen, B.:
Utility Perturbations and the Equilibrium Price Set,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 8 (1981) 277-307.

\item Allen, B.:
The Existence of Fully Rational Expectations Approximate Equilibria with Noisy Price Observations,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 37 (1985) 213-253.

\item Amir, R. and Evstigneev, I.V.:
A Functional Central Limit Theorem for Equilibrium Paths of Economic Dynamics,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 33 (2000) 81-99.

\item Anderson, R.M.: (E-Article)
A Market Value Approach to Approximate Equilibria,
{\em Econometrica} 50 (1982) 127-136.

\item Araujo, A., Martins-da-Rocha, V.F. and Monterio, P.K.:
Equilibria in Reflexive Banach Lattices with a Continuum of Agents,
{\em Economic Theory} 24 (2004) 469-492.

\item Arrow, K.J. and Debreu, G.:
Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy,
{\em Econometrica} 22 (1954) 265-290.

\item Aussel, D. and Dutta, J.:
Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem, Variational Inequality
and Quasiconvexity,
{\em Operations Research Letters} 36 (2008) 461-464.

\item Bagh, A.:
Equilibrium in Abstract Economies without the Lower Semi-Continuity of the
Constraint Maps,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 30 (1998) 175-185.

\item Balasko, Y.:
Some Results on Uniqueness and on Stability of Equilibrium in General
Equilibrium Theorey,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 2 (1975) 95-118.

\item Balasko, Y.:
The Set of Regular Equilibria,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 58 (1992) 1-8.

\item Balasko, Y.:
The Expectational Stability of Walrasian Equilibria,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 23 (1994) 179-203.

\item Balasko, Y.:
Pareto Optima, Welfare Weights, and Smooth Equilibrium Analysis,
{\em Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control} 21 (1997) 473-503.

\item Balasko, Y.:
Equilibrium Analysis of the Infinite Horizon Model with Smooth Discounted
Utility Functions,
{\em Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control} 21 (1997) 783-829.

\item Balasko, Y. and Cass, D.:
The Structure of Financial Equilibrium with Exogenous Yields: The Case of
Incomplete Markets,
{\em Econometrica} 57 (1989) 135-162.

\item Balasko, Y., Cass, D. and Shell, K.:
Existence of Competitive Equilibrium in a General Overlaping-Generations
Model,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 23 (1980) 307-322.

\item Balasko, Y., Cass, D. and Siconolfi, P.:
The Structure of Financial Equilibrium with Exogenous Yields,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 19 (1990) 195-216.

\item Balasko, Y. and Shell, K.:
The Overlapping-Generations Model I: The Case of Pure Exchange without Money,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 23 (1980) 281-306.

\item Balder, E.J.:
Comments on the Existence of Equilibrium Distributions,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 25 (1996) 307-323.

\item Balistreri, E.J.:
Operationalizing Equilibrium Unemployment: A General Equilibrium External
Economics Approach,
{\em Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control} 26 (2002) 347-374.

\item Benhabib, J. and Nishimura, K.:
Competitive Equilibrium Cycles,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 35 (1985) 284-306.

\item Berliant, M.:
An Equilibrium Existence Result for an Economy with Land,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 14 (1985) 53-56.

\item Berliant, M. and Dunz, K.:
Existence of Equilibrium with Nonconvexities and Finitely Many Agents,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 24 (1995) 83-93.

\item Bewley, T.F.:
Stationary Equilibrium,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 24 (1981) 265-295.

\item Carmona, G.: (E-Article)
Polytopes and the Existence of Approximate Equilibria in Discontinuous Games,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 68 (2010) 381-388.

\item Chakrabarti, S.K.:
Refinements of the $\beta$-Core and the Strong Equilibrium and the Aumann Proposition,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 17 (1988) 205-224.

\item Ding, X.P. and Yao, J.C.:
Maximal Element Theorems with Applications to Generalized Games and Systems of Generalized Vector Quasi-Equilibrium Problems in $G$-Convex Spaces,
{\em Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications} 126 (2005) 571-588.

\item Dube, P., Liu, Z., Wynter, L. and Xia, C.:
Competitive Equilibrium in E-Commerce: Pricing and Outsourcing,
{\em Computers and Operations Research} 34 (2007) 3541-3559.

\item Faias, M.: (E-Article)
Approximate Equilibrium in Pure Strategies For a Two-Stage Game of Asset Creation,
{\em Decisions Econ Finan} 31 (2008) 117-136.

\item Florenzano, M.:
Production Equilibria in Vector Lattices,
{\em Economic Theory} 17 (2001) 577-598.

\item Hildenbrand, W., Schmeidler, D. and Zamir, S.: (E-Article),
Existence of Approximate Equilibria and Cores,
{\em Econometrica} 41 (1973) 1159-1166.

\item Holzman, R., Kfir-Dahav, N., Monderer, D. and Tennenholtz, M.:
Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 47 (2004) 104-123.

\item Khan, M.A.: (E-Article and Paper Article)
Some Approximate Equilibria,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 2 (1975) 63-86.

\item Khan, M.A., Tourky, R. and Vohra, R.:
The Supremum Argument in the New Approach to the Existence of Equilibrium in Vector Lattices,
{\em Economics Letters} 63 (1999) 61-65.

\item Khan, M.A. and Vohra, R.:
Equilibrium in Abstract Economies without Ordered Preferences and with a Measure Space of Agents,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 13 (1984) 133-142.

\item Kontogiannis, S.C. and Spirakis, P.G.: (E-Article)
Well Supported Approximate Equilibria in Bimatrix Games,
{\em Algorithmica} 57 (2010) 653-667.

\item Kontogiannis, S.C. and Spirakis, P.G.: (E-Article)
Efficient Algorithms for Constant Well Supported Approximate Equilibria in Bimatrix Games,
{\em } (2007) 595-606.

\item Lo, K.C.:
Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 71 (1996) 443-484.

\item Mallozzi, L., Pusillo, L. and Tijs, S.: (E-Article)
Approximate Equilibria For Bayesian Games,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications} 343 (2008) 1098-1102.

\item Marakulin, V.M.:
Equilibria with Nonstandard Prices in Vector Lattices Overlapping Generations Economies,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications} 282 (2003) 648-667.

\item Meister, H.: (E-Article)
On The Existence of Approximate Equilibrium In Pure Strategies For A Game With Incomplete Information,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 13 (1987) 129-139.

\item Morgan, J. and Raucci, R.:
Lower Semicontinuity for Approximate Social Nash Equilibria,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 31 (2002) 499-509.

\item Morgan, J. and Raucci, R.:
New Convergence Results for Nash Equilibria,
{\em Journal of Convex Analysis} 6 (1999) 377-385.

\item Park, S.:
Generalizations of the Nash Equilibrium Theorem in the KKM Theory,
{\em Fixed Point Theory and Applications} 2009, Artcile ID 234706.

\item P\'{a}scoa, M.R.: (E-Article and Paper Article)
Approximate Equilibrium in Pure Strategies for Non-Atomic Games,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 22 (1993) 223-241.

\item P\'{a}scoa, M.R.:
Nash Equilibrium and the Law of Large Numbers,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 27 (1998) 83-92.

\item P\'{a}scoa, M.R., da Costa Werlang, S.R.:
Determinancy of Equilibria in Nonsmooth Economies,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 32 (1999) 289-302.

\item Podczeck, K.:
Equilibria in Vector Lattices without Ordered Preferences or Uniform Properness,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 25 (1996) 465-485.

\item Podczeck, K.:
On Core-Walras Equivalece in Banach Lattices,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 41 (2005) 764-792.

\item Spirakis, P.G.: (E-Article)
Approximate Equilibria for Strategic Two Person Games,
{\em } (2008) 5-21.

\item Tourky, R.:
A New Approach to the Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy in Vector Lattices,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 78 (1998) 321-328.

\item Tourky, R.:
Production Equilibria in Locally Proper Economies with Unbounded and Unordered Consumers,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 32 (1999) 303-315.

\item Tourky, R.:
The Limit Theorem on the Core of a Production Economy in Vector Lattices with Unordered Preferences,
{\em Economic Theory} 14 (1999) 219-226.

\item Voorneveld, M.: (E-Article)
Equilibria And Approximate Equilibria In Infinite Potential Games,
{\em Economics Letters} 56 (1997) 163-169.

\begin{equation}{\label{c}}\tag{C}\mbox{}\end{equation}

Common Knowledge.

\item Alberucci, L. and J\”{a}ger, G.:
About Cut Elimination for Logics of Common Knowledge,
{\em Annals of Pure and Applied Logic} 133 (2005) 73-99.

\item Aumann, R.J.:
Agreeing to Disagree,
{\em The Annals of Statistics} 4 (1976) 1236-1239.

\item Aumann, R.J.:
Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 8 (1995) 6-19.

\item Aumann, R.J.:
Common Priors: A Reply to Gul,
{\em Econometrica} 66 (1998) 929-938.

\item Aumann, R.J.:
Interactive Epistemology I: Knowledge; II: Probability,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 28 (1999) 263-300;
28 (1999) 301-314.

\item Bacharach, M.:
Some Extensions of a Claim of Aumann in an Axiomatic Model of Knowledge,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 37 (1985) 167-190.

\item Bergin, J.:
We Eventually Agree,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 17 (1989) 57-66.

\item Biacino, L. and Simonelli, M.R.:
Fuzzy Common Knowledge,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 24 (1995) 73-82.

\item Billot, A., Chateauneuf, A., Gilboa, I. and Tallon, J.-M.:
Sharing Beliefs: Between Agreeing and Disagreeing,
{\em Econometrica} 68 (2000) 685-694.

\item Billot, A. and Walliser, B.:
Epistemic Properties of Knowledge Hierarchies,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 32 (1999) 185-205.

\item Bonanno, G. and Nehring, K.:
On the Logic and Role of Negative Introspection of Common Belief,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 35 (1998) 17-36.

\item Bonanno, G. and Nehring, K.:
How to Make Sense of the Common Prior Assumption under Incomplete Information,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 28 (1999) 409-434.

\item B\”{o}rgers, T.:
Weak Dominance and Approximate Common Knowledge,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 64 (1994) 265-276.

\item Brandenburger, A.:
Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games,
{\em Journal of Economic Perspectives} 6 \# (1992) 83-101.

\item Brandenburger, A. and Dekel, E.:
Common Knowledge with Probability $1$,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 16 (1987) 237-245.

\item Brandenburger, A. and Dekel, E.:
Hierachies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 59 (1993) 189-198.

\item Cave, J.A.K.:
Learning to Agree,
{\em Economic Letters} 12 (1983) 147-152.

\item Chwe, M. S.-Y.:
The Reeded Edge and the Phillips Curve: Money Neutrality, Common
Knowledge, and Subjective Beliefs,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 87 (1999) 49-71.

\item Dimitri, N.:
Coordination in an E-Mail Game without “Almost Common Knowledge”,
{\em Journal of Logic, Language and Information} 12 (2003) 1-11.

\item Epstein, L.G. and Wang, T.:
“Beliefs about Beliefs” without Probabilities,
{\em Econometrica} 64 (1996) 1343-1373.

\item Fagin, R., Halpern, J.Y., Moses, Y. and Vardi, M.Y.:
Common Knowledge Revisited,
{\em Annals of Pure and Applied Logic} 96 (1999) 89-105.

\item Fagin, R., Halpern, J.Y. and Vardi, M.Y.:
A Model-Theoretic Analysis of Knowledge,
{\em Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery} 38 (1991) 382-428.

\item Fagin, R., Geanakoplos, J., Halpern, J.Y. and Vardi, M.Y.:
The Hierarchical Approach to Modeling Knowledge and Common Knowledge,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 28 (1999) 331-365.

\item Fagin, R. and Halpern, J.Y.:
Reasoning About Knowledge and Probability,
{\em Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery} 41 (1994) 340-367.

\item Falmagne, J.-C.:
Stochastic Learning Paths in a Knowledge Structure,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Psychology} 37 (1993) 489-512.

\item Geanakoplos, J.:
Common Knowledge,
{\em Journal of Economic Perspectives} 6 \#6 (1992) 53-82.

\item Geanakoplos, J. and Polemarchakis, H.M.:
We Can’t Disagree Forever,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 28 (1982) 192-200.

\item Gilboa, I. and Schmeidler, D.:
Information Dependent Games: Can Common Sense be Common Knowledge?
{\em Economics Letters} 27 (1988) 215-221.

\item Gul, F.:
A Comment on Aumann’s Bayesian View,
{\em Econometrica} 66 (1998) 923-927.

\item Halpern, J.Y.:
Hypothetical Knowledge and Counterfactual Reasoning,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 28 (1999) 315-330.

\item Halpern, J.Y. and Moses, Y.:
Knowledge and Common Knowledge in a Distributed Environment,
{\em Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery} 37 (1990) 549-587.

\item Halpern, J.Y. and Moses, Y.:
A Guide to Completeness and Complexity for Modal Logics of Knowledge and Belief,
{\em Artificial Intelligence} 54 (1992) 319-379.

\item Halpern, J.Y. and Shore, R.A.:
Reasoning about Common Knowledge with Infinitely Many Agents,
{\em Information and Computation} 191 (2004) 1-40.

\item Halpern, J.Y. and Tuttle, M.R.:
Knowledge, Probability, and Adversaries,
{\em Journal of the Association for Computing Machinery} 40 (1993) 917-962.

\item Hart, S., Heifetz, A., and Samet. D.:
“Knowing Whether”, “Knowing that” and the Cardinality of State Spaces,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 70 (1996) 249-256.

\item Heifetz, A.:
Comment on Consensus without Common Knowledge,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 70 (1996) 273-277.

\item Heifetz, A.:
How Canonical is the Canonical Model? A Comment on Aumann’s Interactive Epistemology,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 28 (1999) 435-442.

\item Heifetz, A. and Samet, D.:
Topology-Free Typology of Belief,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 82 (1998) 324-341.

\item Heifetz, A. and Samet, D.:
Knowledge Spaces with Arbitrarily Rank,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 22 (1998) 260-273.

\item Heifetz, A. and Samet, D.:
Hierarhies of Knowledge: An Unbounded Stairway,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 38 (1999) 157-170.

\item Heifetz, A. and Samet, D.:
Coherent Beliefs are not Always Types,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 32 (1999) 475-488.

\item Kambouri, M., Koppen, M., Villano, M. and Falmagne, J.-C.:
Knowledge Assessment: Tapping Humann Expertise by the QUERY Routine,
{\em Int. J. Human-Computer Studies} 40 (1994) 119-151.

\item Kaneko, M. and Nagashima, T.:
Final Decisions, the Nash Equilibrium and Solvability in Games with
Common Knowledge of Logical Abilities,
{\em Mathematical Socail Sciences} 22 (1991) 229-255.

\item Kaneko, M., Nagashima, T., Suzuki, N.-Y. and Tanaka, Y.:
A Map of Common Knowledge Logics,
{\em Studia Logica} 71 (2002) 57-86.

\item Koessler, F.:
Common Knowledge and Consensus with Noisy Communication,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 42 (2001) 139-159.

\item Koessler, F.:
Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 48 (2004) 292-320.

\item Koppen, M.:
Extrating Human Expertise for Constructing Knowledge Spaces: An Algorithm,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Psychology} 37 (1993) 1-20.

\item Koppen, M.:
On Alternative Representations for Knowledge Spaces,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 36 (1998) 127-143.

\item Koppen, M. and Doignon, J.-P.:
How to Build a Knowledge Space by Querying an Expert,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Psychology} 34 (1990) 311-331.

\item Krasucki, P.:
Protocols Forcing Consensus,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 70 (1996) 266-272.

\item Kraus, S. and Lehmann, D.:
Knowledge, Belief and Time,
{\em Theoretical Computer Science} 58 (1988) 155-174.

\item Lipman, B.L.:
A Note on the Implications of Common Knowledge of Rationality,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 6 (1994) 114-129.

\item Lismont, L. and Mongin, P.:
Belief Closure: A Semantics of Common Knowledge for Modal Propositional Logic,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 30 (1995) 127-153.

\item Matsuhisa, T. and Kamiyama, K.:
Lattice Structure of Knowledge and Agreeing to Disagree,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 27 (1997) 389-410.

\item McKelvey, R.D. and Page, T.:
Common Knowledge, Consensus, and Aggregate Information,
{\em Econometrica} 54 (1986) 109-127.

\item Meier, M.:
On the Nonexistence of Universal Information Structures,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 122 (2005) 132-139.

\item Milgrom, P.:
An Axiomatic Characterization of Common Knowledge,
{\em Econometrica} 49 (1981) 219-222.

\item Milgrom, P. and Stokey, N.:
Information, Trade and Common Knowledge,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 26 (1982) 17-27.

\item Monderer, D. and Samet, D.:
Approximate Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 1 (1989) 170-190.

\item Morris, S.:
Trade with Heterogenous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information,
{\em Econometrica} 62 (1994) 1327-1347.

\item Morris, S.:
Approximate Common Knowledge Revisited,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 28 (1999) 385-408.

\item Morris, S. and Shin, H.S.:
Approximate Common Knowledge and Coordination: Recent Lessons from
Game Theory,
{\em Journal of Logic, Language, and Information} 6 (1997) 171-190.

\item Neeman, Z.:
Approximating Agreeing to Disagree Results with Common $p$-Beliefs,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 12 (1996) 162-164.

\item Nielsen, L.T.:
Common Knowledge, Communication, and Convergence of Beliefs,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 8 (1984) 1-14.

\item Nielsen, L.T.:
Common Knowledge of Multivariate Aggregate Statistic,
{\em International Economic Review} 36 (1995) 207-216.

\item Nielsen, L.T.:
Common Knowledge: The Case of Linear Regression,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 26 (1996) 285-304.

\item Nielsen, L.T., Brandenburger, A., Geanakoplos, J., McKelvey, R. and Page, T.:
Common Knowledge of an Aggregate of Expectations,
{\em Econometrica} 58 (1990) 1235-1239.

\item Nishihara, K.:
A Note on the Equivalence of the two Definitions of Common Knowledge,
{\em Mathematical Socail Sciences} 21 (1991) 177-178.

\item Parikh, R. and Krasucki, P.:
Communication, Consensus, and Knowledge,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 52 (1990) 178-189.

\item Polak, B.:
Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium and Common Knowledge of Rationality,
{\em Econometrica} 67 (1999) 673-676.

\item Polemarchakis, H.M.:
Observable Probabilistic Beliefs,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 11 (1983) 65-75.

\item Rubinstein, A.:
The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under “Almost Common
Knowledge”,
{\em The American Economic Review} 79 (1989) 385-391.

\item Rubinstein, A. and Wolinsky, A.:
On the Logic of “Agreeing to Disagree” Type Results,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 51 (1990) 184-193.

\item Rybakov, V.V.:
Refined Common Knowledge Logics or Logics of Common Information,
{\em Arch. Math. Logic} 42 (2003) 179-200.

\item Sakovics, J.:
Games of Incomplete Information without Common Knowledge Prior,
{\em Theory and Decision} 50 (2001) 347-366.

\item Salonen, H. and Nurmi, H.:
A Note on Rough Sets and Common Knowledge Events,
{\em European Journal of Operational Research} 112 (1999) 692-695.

\item Samet, D.:
Ignoring Ignorance and Agreeing and Disagree,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 52 (1990) 190-207.

\item Samet, D.:
Agreeing to Disagree in Infinite Information Structures,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 21 (1992) 213-218.

\item Samet, D.:
Hypothetical Knowledge amd Games with Perfect Information,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 17 (1996) 230-251.

\item Samet, D.:
Iterated Expectations and Common Priors,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 24 (1998) 131-141.

\item Samet, D.:
Common Priors and Separation of Convex Sets,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 24 (1998) 172-174.

\item Samuelson, L.:
Dominated Strategies and Common Knowledge,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 4 (1992) 284-313.

\item Sebenius, J.K. and Geanakoplos, J.:
Don’t Bet on it: Contingent Agreements with Asymmetric Information,
{\em Journal of the American Statistical Association} 78 (1983) 424-426.

\item Shin, H.S.:
Logical Structure of Common Knowledge,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 60 (1993) 1-13,

\item Shin, H.S. and Williamson, T.:
How Much Common Belief is Necessary for a Convention?
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 13 (1996) 252-268.

\item Simon, R.S.:
The Difference between Common Knowledge of Formulas and Sets,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 28 (1999) 367-384.

\item Simon, R.S.:
The Generation of Formulas Held in Common Knowledge,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 30 (2001) 1-18.

\item Sonsino, D.:
“Impossibility of Speculation” Theorems with Noisy Information,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 8 (1995) 406-423.

\item Sturm, H., Wolter, F. and Zakharyaschev, M.:
Common Knowledge and Quantification,
{\em Economic Theory} 19 (2002) 157-186.

\item van der Meyden, R.:
Common Knowledge and Update in Finite Environments,
{\em Information and Computation} 140 (1998) 115-157.

\item Vannetelbosch, V.J.:
Alternating-Offer Bargainig and Common Knowledge of Rationality,
{\em Theory and Decision} 47 (1999) 111-137.

\item Vassilakis, S. and Zamir, S.:
Common Belief and Common Knowledge,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 22 (1993) 495-505.

\item Wolter, F.:
First Order Common Knowledge Logics,
{\em Studia Logica} 65 (2000) 249-271.

\begin{equation}{\label{d}}\tag{D}\mbox{}\end{equation}

Rationality.

\item Allen, B.:
The Existence of Rational Expectations Equilibria in a Large Economy with
Noisy Price Observations,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 14 (1985) 67-103.

\item Anderson, R.M. and Sonnenschein, H.:
On the Existence of Rational Expectations Equilibrium,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 26 (1982) 261-278.

\item Arrow, K.J.:
Rationality of Self and Others in an Ecomonic System,
{\em Journal of Business} 59 (1986) s385-s399.

\item Aumann, R.J.:
Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality,
{\em Econometrica} 55 (1987) 1-18.

\item Aumann, R.J.:
Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 8 (1995) 6-19.

\item Aumann, R.J.:
Ratinality and Bounded Rationality,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 21 (1997) 2-14.

\item Ausubel, L.M.:
Partially-Revealing Rational Expectations Equilibrium in a Competitive
Economy,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 50 (1990) 93-126.

\item Bandyopadhyay, T.:
Rationality, Path Independence, and the Power Structure,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 40 (1986) 338-348.

\item Barrette, C.R., Pattanaik, P.K. and Salles, M.:
Rationality and Aggregation of Preferences in an Ordinally Fuzzy
Framework,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 49 (1992) 9-13.

\item Basu, K.:
On the Non-Existence of a Rationality Definition for Extensive Games,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 19 (1990) 33-44.

\item Basu, K.:
Group Rationality, Utilitarianism, and Escher’s Waterfall,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 7 (1994) 1-9.

\item Basu, K. and Weibull, J.W.:
Strategy Subsets Closed under Rational Behavior,
{\em Economics Letters} 36 (1991) 141-146.

\item Battigalli, P.:
Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 13 (1996) 178-200.

\item Benassy, J.-P. and Blad, M.C.:
On Learning and Rational Expectations in an Overlapping Generations
Model,
{\em Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control} 13 (1989) 379-400.

\item Bernheim, B.D.:
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior,
{\em Econometrica} 52 (1984) 1007-1928.

\item Bhattacharya, G.:
Notes on Optimality of Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Incomplete
Markets,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 42 (1987) 191-208.

\item Blair, D.H., Bordes, G., Kelley, J.S. and Suzumura, K.:
Impossibility Theorems without Collective Rationality,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 13 (1976) 361-379.

\item Blonski, M.:
When is Rational Behavior Consistent with Rules of Thumb? A Link between
Evolutionary Terminology and Neoclassical Methodology,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 32 (1999) 131-144.

\item Blume, L.E., Bray, M.M. and Easley, D.:
Introduction to the Stability of Rational Expectations Equilibrium,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 26 (1982) 313-317.

\item Blume, L.E. and Easley, D.:
Learning to be Rational,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 26 (1982) 340-351.

\item Blume, L.E. and Easley, D.:
Rational Expectations Equilibrium: An Alternative Approach,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 34 (1984) 116-129.

\item Brandenburger, A. and Dekel, E.:
Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria,
{\em Econometrica} 55 (1987) 1391-1402.

\item Bray, M.:
Learning, Estimation, and the Stability of Rational Expectations,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 26 (1982) 318-339.

\item Bray, M.M. and Savin, N.E.:
Rational Expectations Equilibria, Learning, and Model Specification,
{\em Econometrica} 54 (1986) 1129-1160.

\item Canning, D.:
Rationality, Computability, and Nash Equilibrium,
{\em Econometrica} 60 (1992) 877-888.

\item Chen, H.-C. and Friedman, J.W.:
Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A Probabilistic Choice Approach,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 18 (1997) 32-54.

\item Citanna, A. and Villanacci, A.:
Existence and Regularity of Partially Revealing Rational Expectations
Equilibrium in Finite Economies,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 34 (2000) 1-26.

\item Dekel, E. and Fudenberg, D.:
Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 52 (1990) 243-267.

\item Einy, E., Moreno, D. and Shitovitz, B.:
Rational Expectations Equilobria and the Ex-post Core of an Economy
with Asymmetric Information,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 34 (2000) 527-535.

\item Ellison, G.:
Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the
Justification of Myopia,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 19 (1997) 180-210.

\item Evans, G.W. and Guesnerie, R.:
Rationalizability, Strong Rationality, and Expectational Stability,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 5 (1993) 632-646.

\item Ewerhart, C.:
Rationality and the Definition of Consistent Pairs,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 27 (1998) 49-59.

\item Feldman, M.:
Bayesian Learning and Convergence to Rational Expectations,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 16 (1987) 297-313.

\item Geanakoplos, J., Pearce, D. and Stacchetti, E.:
Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 1 (1989) 60-79.

\item Grossman, S.J.:
An Introduction to the Theory of Rational Expectations under Asymmetric
Information,
{\em The Review of Economic Studies} 48 (1981) 541-559.

\item Hansen, L.P. and Singleton, K.J.:
Generalized Instrumental Variables Estimation of Nonlinear Rational
Expectations Models,
{\em Econometrica} 50 (1982) 1269-1286.

\item Heinemann, M.:
Adaptive Learning of Rational Expectations Using Neural Networks,
{\em Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control} 24 (2000) 1007-1026.

\item Hellwig, M.F.:
Rational Expectations and the Markov Property of Temporary Equilibrium
Processes,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 9 (1982) 135-144.

\item Hellwig, M.F.:
Rational Expectations Equilibrium with Condition on Past Prices: A
Mean-Variance Example,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 26 (1982) 279-312.

\item Hellwig, M.:
Rational Expectations Equilibria in Sequence Economies with Symmetric
Information: The Two-Period Case,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 26 (1996) 9-49.

\item Hendon, E., Jacobsen, H.J. and Sloth, B.:
The One-Shot-Deviation Principle for Sequential Rationality,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 12 (1996) 274-282.

\item Herings, P. J.-J. and Vannetelbosch, V.J.:
Refinements of Rationalizability for Normal-Form Games,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 28 (1999) 53-68.

\item Inada, K.-I.:
Majority Rule and Rationality,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 2 (1970) 27-40.

\item Jordan, J.S.:
The Generic Existence of Rational Expectations Equilibrium in the Higher
Dimensional Case,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 26 (1982) 224-243.

\item Jordan, J.S.:
A Dynamic Model of Expectations Equilibrium,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 28 (1982) 235-254.

\item Jordan, J.S. and Radner, R.:
Rational Expectations in Microeconomic Models: An Overview,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 26 (1982) 201-223.

\item Kalai, E. and Lehrer, E.:
Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium,
{\em Econometrica} 61 (1993) 1019-1045.

\item Koutsougeras, L. and Yannelis, N.C.:
Bounded Rational Learning in Differential Information Economies: Core and
Value,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 31 (1999) 373-391.

\item Kreps, D.M., Milgrom, P., Roberts, J. and Wilson, R.:
Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 27 (1982) 245-252.

\item Kreps, D.M. and Ramey, G.:
Structural Consistency, Consistency, and Sequential Rationality,
{\em Econometrica} 55 (1987) 1331-1348.

\item Lehrer, E. and Nitzan, S.:
Some General Results on the Metric Rationalization for Social Decision Rules,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 37 (1985) 191-201.

\item Lipman, B.L.:
How to Decide How to Descide How to…: Modelling Limited Rationality,
{\em Econometrica} 59 (1991) 11-5-1125.

\item Lipman, B.L.:
A Note on the Implications of Common Knowledge of Rationality,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 6 (1994) 114-129.

\item Marschak, J.:
Rational Behavior, Uncertain Prospects, and Measurable Utility,
{\em Econometrica} 18 (1950) 111-141.

\item Milgrom, P. and Roberts, J.:
Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic
Complementarities,
{\em Econometrica} 58 (1990) 1255-1277.

\item Miller, R.I. and Sanchirico, C.W.:
The Role of Absolute Continuity in “Merging of Opinions” and
“Rational Learning”,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 29 (1999) 170-190.

\item Miranda, M.J. and Rui, X.:
Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Nonlinear Rational Expectations
Asset Pricing Model,
{\em Journal of Economic Dynamics and COntrol} 21 (1997) 1493-1510.

\item Nau, R.F. and McCardle, K.F.:
Arbitrage, Rationality, and Equilibrium,
{\em Theory and Decision} 31 (1991) 199-240.

\item Newbery, D.M.G. and Stiglitz, J.E.:
The Choice of Techniques and the Optimality of Market Equilibrium with
Rational Expectations,
{\em Journal of Political Economy} 90 (1982) 223-246.

\item Nyarko, Y., Woodford, M. and Yannelis, N.C.:
Bounded Rationality and Learning: Introduction,
{\em Economic Theory} 4 (1994) 811-820.

\item Page, F.H. and Wooders, M.H.:
A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for the Compactness of Individually
Rational and Feasible Outcomes and the Existence of an Equilibrium,
{\em Economics Letters} 52 (1996) 153-162.

\item Pearce, D.G.:
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perefction,
{\em Econometrica} 52 (1984) 1029-1050.

\item Plott, C.R.:
Path Independence, Rationality, and Social Choice,
{\em Econometrica} 41 (1973) 1075-1090.

\item Rabin, M.:
Communication between Rational Agents,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 51 (1990) 144-170.

\item Rahi, R.:
Partially Revealing Rational Expectations Equilibria with Nominal Assets,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 24 (1995) 137-146.

\item Reny, P.J.:
Rationality in Extensive-Form Games,
{\em Journal of Economic Perspectives} 6 \#4 (1992) 103-118.

\item Richter, M.K.:
Duality and Rationality,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 20 (1979) 131-181.

\item Rubinstein, A. and Wolinsky, A.:
Rationalizable Conjectual Equilibrium: Between Nash and Rationalizability,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 6 (1994) 299-311.

\item S\'{a}nchez, M.C.:
Rationality of Bargaining Solutions,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 33 (2000) 389-399.

\item Sandroni, A. and Smorodinsky, R.:
The Speed of Rational Learning,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 28 (1999) 199-210.

\item Schuhmacher, F.:
Proper Rationalizability and Backward Induction,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 28 (1999) 599-615.

\item Sethi, R.:
Stability of Equilibria in Games with Procedurally Rational Players,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 32 (2000) 85-104.

\item Sobolev, A.:
The Nucleolus for Cooperative Games with Arbitrary Bounds of Individual
Rationality,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 24 (1995) 13-22.

\item Stahl, D.O.:
Boundedly Rational Rule Learning in a Guessing Game,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 16 (1996) 303-330.

\item Stahn, H.:
A Remark on Rational Expectation Equilibria with Incomplete Markets
and Real Assets,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 33 (2000) 441-448.

\item Stanford, W.:
Individually Rational Pure Strategies in Large Games,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 47 (2004) 221-233.

\item Stennek, J.:
The Survival Value of Assuming Others to be Rational,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 29 (2000) 147-163.

\item Swinkels, J.M.:
Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 5 (1993) 455-484.

\item Walliser, B.:
Instrumental Rationality and Cognitive Rationality,
{\em Theory and Decision} 27 (1989) 7-36.

\item Weibull, J.W.:
Evolution, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games,
{\em Eurpoean Economic Review} 42 (1998) 641-649.

\item Zemel, E.:
Small Talk and Cooperation: A Note on Bounded Rationality,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 49 (1989) 1-9.

\begin{equation}{\label{e}}\tag{E}\mbox{}\end{equation}

Utility.

\item Aliprantis, C.D.:
Separable Utility Functions,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 28 (1997) 415-444.

\item Back, K.:
Concepts of Similarity for Utility Functions,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 15 (1986) 129-142.

\item Ballestero, E. and Romero, C.:
Utility Optimization when the Utility Functions is Virtually Unknown,
{\em Theory and Decision} 37 (1994) 233-243.

\item Beardon, A.F. and Mehta, G.B.:
Utility Functions and the Order Type of the Continum,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 23 (1994) 387-390.

\item Billot, A.:
An Existence Theorem for Fuzzy Utility Functions: A New Elementary Proof,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 74 (1995) 271-276.

\item Blackorby, C., Primont, D. and Russell, R.R.:
Some Simple Remarks on Duality and the Structure of Utility Functions,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 11 (1975) 155-160.

\item Bosi, G., Candeal, J.C. and Indur\'{a}in, E.:
Continuous Representability of Homothetic Preferences by Means of
Homogeneous Utility Functions,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 33 (2000) 291-298.

\item Candeal, J.C. and Indur\'{a}in, E.:
Utility Functions on Chains,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 22 (1993) 161-168.

\item Candeal-Haro, J.C. and Indu\'{a}in-Eraso, E.:
Utility Representation from the Concept of Measure,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 26 (1993) 51-62.

\item Chamberlain, G.:
A Characterization of the Distributions That Imply Mean-Variance Utility
Functions,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 29 (1983) 185-201.

\item Cox, J.C.:
A Theorem on Additively-Separable, Quasi-Concave Functions,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 6 (1973) 210-212.

\item Crouzeix, J.-P.:
Duality between Direct and Indirect Utility Functions,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 12 (1983) 149-165.

\item Debreu, G.:
Least Concave Utility Functions,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 3 (1976) 121-129.

\item Dementiev, N.P.:
Turnpike Theorem: The Case when Utility is not Additively Separable with
Respect to Time,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 18 (1989) 385-397.

\item Epstein, L.G.:
Implicitly Additive Utility and the Nature of Optimal Economic Growth,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 15 (1986) 111-128.

\item Fishburn, P.C.:
Separation Theorems and Expected Utilities,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 11 (1975) 16-34.

\item Fishburn, P.C.:
A Note on Linear Utility,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 27 (1982) 444-446.

\item Fishburn, P.C.:
Transitive Measurable Utility,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 31 (1983) 293-317.

\item Fishburn, P.C.:
Utility Functions on Ordered Convex Sets,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 12 (1983) 221-232.

\item Fishburn, P.C.:
Dominance in SSB Utility Theory,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 34 (1984) 130-148.

\item Fishburn, P.C.:
Non-Transitive Measurable Utility for Decision under Uncertainty,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 18 (1989) 187-207.

\item Fishburn, P.C. and Keeney, R.L. :
Generalized Utility Independence and Some Implications.
{\em Operations Research} 23 (1975) 928-940.

\item Fishburn, P.C. and LaValle, I.H.:
Subjective Expected Lexicographic Utility with Infinite State Sets,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 30 (1998) 323-346.

\item Fisher, F.M.:
Gross Subsitutes and the Utility Function,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 4 (1972) 82-87.

\item Friedman, M. and Savage, L.J.:
The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk,
{\em Journal of Political Economy} 56 (1948) 279-304.

\item Gilboa, I.:
Expected Utility with Purely Subjective Non-Additive Probabilities,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 16 (1987) 65-88.

\item Gilboa, I. and Schmeidler, D.:
Maxmin Expected Utility with Non-Unique Prior,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 18 (1989) 141-153.

\item Grandmont, J.-M.:
Continuity Properties of a von Neumann-Morgenstern Utility,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 4 (1972) 45-57.

\item Herden, G.:
On the Existence of Utility Functions,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 17 (1989) 297-313.

\item Herden, G.:
Some Lifting Theorems for Continuous Utility Functions,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 18 (1989) 119-134.

\item Herden, G.:
On Some Equivalent Approaches to Mathematical Utility,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 29 (1995) 19-31.

\item Iwai, K.:
Optimal Economic Growth and Stationary Ordinal Utility — A Fisherian
Approach,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 5 (1972) 121-151.

\item Jackson, M.O.:
Continuous Utility Functions in Consumer Theory,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 15 (1986) 63-77.

\item Jackson, S. and Mauldin, R.D.:
Borel Measurable Selections of Paretian Utility Functions,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 23 (1994) 361-378.

\item Joshi, S.:
Recursive Utility and Optimal Growth under Uncertainty,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 24 (1995) 601-617.

\item Kannai, Y.:
Non-Standard Concave Utility Functions,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 21 (1992) 51-58.

\item Khutoretsky, A.:
Housing Market Short-Term Equilibriums Maximizing Linear Utility Functions,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 32 (1999) 355-364.

\item Lau, L.J.:
Duality and Structure of Utility Functions,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 1 (1970) 374-396.

\item Mart\'{i}nez-Legaz, J.-E.:
Duality between Direct and Indirect Utility Functions under Minimal
Hypotheses,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 20 (1991) 199-209.

\item Mathieu-Nicot, B.:
Fuzzy Expected Utility,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 20 (1986) 163-173.

\item Mehta, G.:
Existence of an Order-Preserving Function on Normally Preordered Spaces,
{\em Bull. Austral. Math. Soc.} 34 (1986) 141-147.

\item Mehta, G.:
Some General Theorems on the Existence of Order-Preserving Functions,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 15 (1988) 135-143.

\item Mongin, P.:
The Paradox of the Bayesian Experts and State-Dependent Utility Theory,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 29 (1998) 331-361.

\item Monteiro, P.K.:
Some Results on the Existence of Utility Functions on Path Connected Spaces,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 16 (1987) 147-156.

\item Munier, B.R.:
Expected Utility verse Anticipated Utility: Where do We Stand?
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 49 (1992) 55-64.

\item Neuefeind, W.:
On Continuous Utility,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 5 (1972) 174-176.

\item Nielsen, L.T.:
The Expected Utility of Portfolios of Asset,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 22 (1993) 439-461.

\item Oginuma, T.:
A Theory of Expected Utility with Nonadditive Probability,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 23 (1994) 451-473.

\item Patel, N.R. and Subrahmanyam, M.G.:
Utility Theory and Participation in Unfair Lotteries,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 19 (1978) 555-557.

\item Peleg, B.:
Utility Functions for Partially Ordered Topological Spaces,
{\em Econometrica} 38 (1970) 93-96.

\item Polemarchakis, H.M. and Rose, D.:
Another Proposition on the Recoverability of Cardinal Utility,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 34 (1984) 164-168.

\item Pollak, R.A.:
Habit Formation and Long-Run Utility Functions,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 13 (1976) 272-297.

\item Quiggin, J.:
A Theory of Anticipated Utility,
{\em Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization} 3 (1982) 323-343.

\item Quiggin, J.:
Efficient Sets with and without the Expected Utility Hypothesis,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 21 (1992) 395-399.

\item Rader, T.:
The Existence of a Utility Function to Represent Preferences,
{\em Review of Economic Studies} 30 (1963) 229-232.

\item Rader, T.:
Utility over Time: The Homothetic Case,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 25 (1981) 219-236.

\item Roberts, J. and Sonnenschein, H.:
Aggregation and the Existence of a Social Utility Function,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 16 (1977) 475-480.

\item Safra, Z. and Zilcha, I.:
Efficient Sets with and without the Expected Utility Hypothesis,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 17 (1988) 369-384.

\item Sakai, Y.:
Revealed Favorability, Indirect Utility, and Direct Utility,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 14 (1977) 113-129.

\item Sankar, U.:
A Utility Function for Wealth for a Risk-Averter,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 6 (1973) 614-617.

\item Scarsini, M.:
Dominance Conditions in Non-Additive Expected Utility Theory,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 21 (1992) 173-184.

\item Segal, U.:
On the Separability of the Quasi Concave Closure of an Additively Separable Function,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 14 (1985) 129-134.

\item Shapley, L.S.:
Lotteries and Menus: A Commet on Unbounded Utilities,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 14 (1977) 446-453.

\item Sondermann, D.:
Utility Representations for Partial Orders,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 21 (1980) 183-188.

\item Subiza, B. and Peris, J.E.:
Nontrivial Pseudo-Utility Functions,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 29 (1998) 67-73.

\item Wakker, P.:
Continuous Subjective Expected Utility with Non-Additive Probabilities,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 18 (1989) 1-27.

\item Wakker, P.:
Under Stochastic Dominance Choquet-Expected Utility and Anticipated Utility
are Identical,
{\em Theory and Decision} 29 (1990) 119-132.

\item Wakker, P.P. and Zank, H.:
A Unified Derivation of Classical Subjective Expected Utility Models through Cardinal Utility,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 32 (1999) 1-19.

\section{Utility Function Theory}
\begin{enumerate}

\item Dyer, J.S. et al :
Multiple Criteria Decision Making, Multiattribute Utility Theory : The Next
Ten Years.
{\em Management Science} 38 (1992) 645-654.

\item Edwards, W. :
How to Use Multiattribute Utility Measurement for Social Decisionmaking.
{\em IEEE Transactioons on Systems, mam, and Cyberneytics} Vol SMC-7 (1997)
326-340.

\item Fishburn, P.C. and Keeney, R.L. :
Generalized Utility Independence and Some Implications.
{\em Operations Research} 23 (1975) 928-940.

\item Keeney, R.L. :
Multiplicative Utility Functions.
{\em Operations Research} 22 (1974) 22-34.

\item Levy, H. :
Stochastic Dominance and Expected Utility : Survey and Analysis.
{\em Management Science} 38 (1992) 555-593.

\begin{equation}{\label{f}}\tag{F}\mbox{}\end{equation}

Applications of Fixed Point Theorems.

\item Adachi, H.:
On a Characterization of Stable Matchings,
{\em Economic Letters} 68 (2000) 43-49.

\item Adachi, H.:
A Search Model of Two-Sided Matching under Nontransferable Utility,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 113 (2003) 182-198.

\item Allouch, N. and Predetchinski, A.:
On the Non-emptiness of the Fuzzy Core,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 37 (2008) 203-210.

\item Chang, C.-L. and Lyuu, Y.-D.:
Optimal Bound on Finding Fixed Points of Contraction Mappings,
{\em Theoretical Computer Science} 411 (2010) 1742-1749.

\item Chang, C.-L., Lyuu, Y.-D. and Ti, Y.-W.:
The Complexity of Tarski’s Fixed Point Theorem,
{\em Theoretical Computer Science} 401 (2008) 228-235.

\item Cirstea, C. and Sadrzadeh, M.:
Modular Games for Coalgebraic Fixed Point Logics,
{\em Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science} 203 (2008) 71-92.

\item d’Orey, V.:
Fixed Point Theorems for Correspondences with Values in a Partially Ordered Set and Extended Supermodular Games,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 25 (1996) 345-354.

\item Echenique, F.:
Extensive-Form Games and Strategic Complementarities,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 46 (2004) 348-364.

\item Echenique, F. and Oviedo, J.:
Core Many-to-One Matchings by Fixed-Point Methods,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 115 (2004) 358-376.

\item Echenique, F. and Yemmez, M.B.:
A Solution to Matching with Preferences over Colleagues,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 59 (2007) 46-71.

\item Fleiner, T.:
A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications,
{\em Mathematics of Operations Research} 28 (2003) 103-126.

\item Hatfield, J.W. and Milgrom, P.R.:
Matching with Contracts,
{\em The American Economic Review} 95 (2005) 913-935.

\item Heikkil\”{a}, S. and Reffett, K.: (Fixed Point Theorems)
Fixed Point Theorems and Their Applications to Theory of Nash Equilibria,
{\em Nonlinear Analysis} 64 (2006) 1415-1436.

\item Herings, P.J.-J. and Predtetchinski, A.:
One-Dimensional Bargaining with Markov Recognition Probabilities,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 145 (2010) 189-215.

\item Horvath, C.D. and Ciscar, J.V.L.:
Maximal Elements and Fixed Points for Binary Relations on Topological Ordered Spaces,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 25 (1996) 291-306.

\item Iimura, T.:
A Discrete Fixed Point Theorem and Its Applications,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 39 (2003) 725-742.

\item Iimura, T., Murota, K. and Tamura, A.:
Discrete Fixed Point Theorem Reconsidered,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 41 (2005) 1030-1036.

\item Ka\'{c}kowiak, P.:
The Existence of Equilibrium without Fixed-Point Arguments,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 46 (2010) 1194-1199.

\item Kajii, A. and Morris, S.:
Common $p$-Belief: The General Case,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 18 (1997) 73-82.

\item Kaufman, D.E., Smith, R.L. and Wunderlich, K.E.:
User-Equilibrium Properties of Fixed Points in Dynamic Traffic Assignment,
{\em Transportation Research Part C} 6 (1998) 1-16.

\item Kucuksenel, S.:
Core of the Assignment Game via Fixed Point Methods,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 47 (2011) 72-76.

\item McLennan, A.:
Fixed Points of Contractible Valued Correspondences,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 18 (1989) 175-184.

\item McLennan, A.:
Consistent Conditional Systems in Noncooperative Game Theory,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 18 (1989) 141-174.

\item McLennan, A.: (Fixed Point Theorems)(Applications of Fixed Point Theorems)
Fixed Points of Parameterized Perturbations,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 55 (2014) 186-189.

\item Ostrovsky, M.:
Stability in Supply Chain Networks,
{\em American Economic Review} 98 (2008) 897-923.

\item Piotrowski, E.W.:
Fixed Point Theorem for Simple Quantum Strategies in Quantum Market Games,
{\em Physica A} 324 (2003) 196-200.

\item Schenk-Hopp\'{e}, K.R. and Schmalfub, B.:
Random Fixed Points in a Stochastic Solow Growth Model,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 36 (2001) 19-30.

\item Sotomayor, M.:
The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Outcomes of the Multiple Partners Assignment Game,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 28 (1999) 567-583.

\item Tanaka, Y.:
On the Equivalence of the Arrow Impossibility Theorem and the Brouwer Fixed Point Theorem when Individual Preferences are Weak Orders,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 45 (2009) 241-249.

\item Tarafdar, E.:
A Fixed Point Theorem and Equilibrium Point of an Abstract Economy,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 20 (1991) 211-218.

\item Tesfatsion, L.:
Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium Points and the Lefschetz Fixed Point Theorem,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 12 (1983) 181-191.

\item van Dalen, D.:
Brouwer’s $\epsilon$-fixed point and Sperner’s Lemma,
{\em Theoretical Computer Science}

\item Villas-Boas, J.M.:
Comparative Statics of Fixed Points,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 73 (1997) 183-198.

\item Weitzman, M.L.:
An “Economic Proof” of the Supporting Hyperplane Theorem,
{\em Economic Letters} 68 (2000) 1-6.

\item Yamamoto, Y.:
A Path-Following Procedure to Find a Proper Equilibrium of Finite Games,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 22 (1993) 249-259.

\item Zhou, L.:
The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game is a Complete Lattice,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 7 (1994) 295-300.

\item Zimper, A.:
A Fixed Point Characterization of the Dominance-Solvability of Lattice Games with Strategic Substitutes,
{\em International Journal of Game Theory} 36 (2007) 107-117.

\begin{equation}{\label{g}}\tag{G}\mbox{}\end{equation}

Preferences.

\item Aliprantis, C.D. and Burkinshaw, O.:
The Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics without Proper Preferences,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 17 (1988) 41-54.

\item Aumann, R.J.:
Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom,
{\em Econometrica} 30 (1962) 445-462.

\item Balcer, Y.:
Equilibrium in an Exchange Economy with Non-Convex Preferences: A Simple Approach,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 23 (1980) 236-242.

\item Barber\'{a}, S., Barrett, C.R. and Pattanaik, P.K.:
On Some Axioms for Ranking Sets of Alternatives,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 33 (1984) 301-308.

\item Barber\'{a}, S. and Sonnenschein, H.:
Preference Aggregation with Randomized Social Orderings,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 18 (1978) 244-254.

\item Beardon, A.F.:
Totally Ordered Subsets of Euclidean Space,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 23 (1994) 3910393.

\item Besada, M. and V\'{a}quez, C.:
Weakly Smooth Preferences on Banach Lattices,
{\em Economics Letters} 59 (1998) 65-69.

\item Bilgic, T.:
Interval-Valued Preference Structures,
{\em European Journal of Operational Research} 105 (1998) 162-183.

\item Binmore, K.G.:
An Example in Group Preference,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 10 (1975) 377-385.

\item Blair, D. and Muller, E.:
Essential Aggregation Procedures on Restricted Domains of Preferences,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 30 (1983) 34-53.

\item Bosi, G. and Isler, R.:
Representing Preferences with Nontransitive Indifference by a Single
Real-Valued Function,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 24 (1995) 621-631.

\item Bridges, D.S.:
Preference and Utility: A Constructive Development,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 9 (1982) 165-185.

\item Bridges, D.S.:
A Numerical Representation of Preferences with Intransitive Indifference,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 11 (1983) 25-42.

\item Bridges, D.S.:
Numerical Representation of Intransitive Preferences on a Conutable Set,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 30 (1983) 213-217.

\item Bridges, D.S.:
Numerical Representation of Interval Oreders on a Topological Space,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 38 (1986) 160-166.

\item Bridges, D.S.:
The Construction of a Continuous Demand Function for Unfomly Rotund Preferences,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 21 (1992) 217-227.

\item Bridges, D.S.:
The Constructive Theory of Preference Relations on a Locally Compact Space — II,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 27 (1994) 1-9.

\item Burness, H.S.:
Impatience and the Preference for Advancement in the Timeing of Satisfactions,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 6 (1973) 495-507.

\item Campbell, D.E.:
Democratic Preference Functions,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 12 (1976) 259-272.

\item Candeal, J.C., Herv\'{e}s, C. and Indur\'{a}in, E.:
Some Results on Representation and Extension of Preferences,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 29 (1998) 75-81.

\item Candeal, J.C. and Indur\'{a}in, E.:
Homothetic and Weakly Homothetic Preferences,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 24 (1995) 147-158.

\item Capotorti, A. and Vantaggi, B.:
Axiomatic Characterization of Partial Ordinal Relations,
{\em International Journal of Approximate Reasoning} 24 (2000) 207-219.

\item Chateauneuf, A.:
Continuous Representation of a Preference Relation on a Connected
Topological Space,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 16 (1987) 139-146.

\item Chichilnisky, G.:
Continuous Representation of Preferences,
{\em Review of Economic Studies} 47 (1980) 959-963.

\item Debreu, G.:
Continuity Properties of Paretian Utility,
{\em International Economic Review} 5 (1964) 285-293.

\item Debreu, G.:
Smooth Preferences,
{\em Econometrica} 40 (1972) 603-615;
Corrigendum {\em Econometrica} 44 (1976) 831-832.

\item Dekel, E.:
An Axiomatic Characterization of Preferences under Uncertainty: Weakening
the Independence Axiom,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 40 (1986) 304-318.

\item Denzau, A.T. and Parks, R.P.:
A Problem with Public Sector Preferences,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 14 (1977) 454-457.

\item Dow, J. and da Costa Werlang, S.R.:
Homothetic Preferences,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 21 (1992) 389-394.

\item Dr\'{e}ze, J.H. and Rustichini, A.:
Moral Hazard and Conditional Preferences,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 31 (1999) 159-181.

\item Dutta, B.:
Existence of Stable Situations, Restricted Preferences, and Strategic
Manipulation under Democratic Group Decision Rules,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 15 (1977) 99-111.

\item Dybvig, P.H.:
Recovering Preferences from Preferences over Nominal Gambles,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 28 (1982) 354-360.

\item Einy, E.:
On Preference Relations which Satisfy Weak Independence Property,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 18 (1989) 291-300.

\item El-Safty, A.E.:
Adaptive Behavior, Demand and Preferences,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 13 (1976) 298-318.

\item Falmagne, J.-C.:
A Stochastic Theory for the Emergence and the Evolution of Preference
Relations,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 31 (1996) 63-84.

\item Feldstein, M.S.:
Mean-Variance Analysis in the Theory of Liquidity Preference and Portfolio
Selection
{\em Review of Economic Studies} 36 (1969) 5-12.

\item Fishburn, P.C.:
Conditions for Simple Majority Decision Functions with Intransitive
Individual Indifference,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 2 (1970) 354-367.

\item Fishburn, P.C.:
Intransitive Indifference with Unequal Indifference Intervals,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Psychology} 7 (1970) 144-149.

\item Fishburn, P.C.:
Interval Representations for Interval Orders and Semiorders,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Psychology} 10 (1973) 91-105.

\item Fon, V. and Otani, Y.:
Classical Welfare Theorems with Non-Transitive and Non-Complete
Preferences,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 20 (1979) 409-418.

\item Freund, M.:
On Rational Preferences,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 30 (1998) 215-228.

\item Fuchs-Seliger, S.:
Budget Preferences and Direct Utility,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 30 (1983) 188-190.

\item Gould, J.P.:
Risk, Stochastic Preference, and the Value of Information,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 8 (1974) 64-84.

\item Grandmont, J.-M.:
Intermediate Preferences and the Majority Rule,
{\em Econometrica} 46 (1978) 317-330.

\item Greenberg, J. and Weber, S.:
Strong Tiebout Equilibrium under Restricted Preferences Domian,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 38 (1986) 101-117.

\item Grether, D.M. and Plott, C.R.:
Economic Theory of Choice and the Preference Reversal Phenomenon,
{\em The American Economic Review} 69 (1979) 623-638.

\item Grodal, B.:
A Note on the Space of Preference Relations,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 1 (1974) 279-294.

\item Hildenbrand, W.:
Random Preferences and Equilibrium Analysis,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 3 (1971) 414-429.

\item Hindy, A., Huang, C.-F. and Kreps, D.:
On Intertemporal Preferences in Continuous Time,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 21 (1992) 401-440.

\item Jaffray, J.-Y.:
Semicontinuous Extension of a Partial Order,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 2 (1975) 395-406.

\item Hurwicz, L., Jordan, J. and Kannai, Y.:
On the Demand Generated by a Smooth and Concavifiable Preference Ordering.
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 16 (1987) 169-189.

\item Kannai, Y.:
Approximation of Convex Preferences,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 1 (1974) 101-106.

\item Karni, E.:
On the Correspondence between Multivariate Risk Aversion and Risk Aversion
with State-Dependent Preferences,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 30 (1983) 230-242.

\item Karni, E.:
Increasing Risk with State-Dependent Preferences,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 35 (1985) 172-177.

\item Karni, E. and Safra, Z.:
“Preference Reversal” and the Observability of Preferences by
Experimantal Methods,
{\em Econometrica} 55 (1987) 675-685.

\item Kehoe, T.J.:
Gross Substitutability and the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 21 (1992) 37-50.

\item Kim, T.:
Revealed Preference Theory on the Choice of Lotteries,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 26 (1996) 463-477.

\item Knoblauch, V.:
Order Isomorphism for Preferences with Intransitive Indifference,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 30 (1998) 421-431.

\item Koch, K.-J.:
Mean Demand when Consumers Satisfy the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 18 (1989) 347-356.

\item Kreps, D.M. and Porteus, E.L.:
Temporal von Neumann-Morgenstern and Induced Preferences,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 20 (1979) 81-109.

\item Kusumoto, S.-I.:
Nice Demand and Concavifiable Smooth Preferences: Determinateness of Utility
Function,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 21 (1992) 563-576.

\item Laffont, J.-J.:
Risk, Stochastic Preference, and the Value of Information,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 12 (1976) 483-487.

\item Laitner, J.P.:
Intergenerational Preference Differences and Optimal National Saving,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 22 (1980) 56-66.

\item Little, J.T.:
Indirect Preferences,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 20 (1979) 182-193.

\item Machina, M.J.:
Temporal Risk and the Nature of Induced Preferences,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 33 (1984) 199-231.

\item Mak, K.-T.:
Notes on Separable Preferences,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 33 (1984) 309-321.

\item Mantel, R.R.:
Homothetic Preferences and Community Excess Demand Functions,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 12 (1976) 197-201.

\item Matsuyama, K.:
Chernoff’s Dual Axiom, Revealed Preference and Weak Rational Choice Functions,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 35 (1985) 155-165.

\item McLennan, A.:
Randomized Preference Aggregation: Additivity of Power and Strategy
Proofness,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 22 (1980) 1-11.

\item Milne, F.:
Induced Preferences and the Theory of the Consumer,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 24 (1981) 205-217.

\item Miyake, M.:
Continuous Representation of Von Neumann-Morgenstern Preferences,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 19 (1990) 323-340.

\item Nakamura, Y.:
Skew-Symmetric Additive Representations of Preferences,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 30 (1998) 367-387.

\item Naval, G., Brezmes, T. amd Bertoluzza, C.:
A Generalized Theory of Preference,
{\em Information Sciences} 113 (1999) 313-322.

\item Neilson, W.S.:
Smooth Indifference Sets,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 20 (1991) 181-197.

\item Neilson, W.S.:
Comparative Statics Derivatives with Nonlinear Preferences,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 24 (1995) 45-57.

\item Peris, J.E., S\'{a}nchez, M.C. and subiza, B.:
Revealed Preference Axioms for Continuous Rational Choice,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 30 (1998) 275-284.

\item Peris, J.E. and Subiza, B.:
Demand Correspondence for Pseudo-Transitive Preferences,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 30 (1995) 307-318.

\item Prakash, P.:
On the Consistency of a Gambler with Time Preference,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 15 (1977) 92-98.

\item Richard, S.F. and Zame, W.R.:
Proper Preferences and Quasi-Concave Utility Functions,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 15 (1986) 231-247.

\item Richter, M.K.:
Revealed Preference Theory,
{\em Econometrica} 34 (1966) 635-645.

\item Rossman, M. and Selden, L.:
Time Preferences, Conditional Risk Preferences, and Two-Period Cardinal
Utility,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 19 (1978) 64-83.

\item Rotar, V.I.:
Preferences and Metric Structure of Spaces of Alternatives,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 27 (1994) 159-184.

\item Sakai, Y.:
Equivalence of the Weak and Strong Axioms of Revealed Preference without
Demand Continuity Assumptions: A “Refularity Condition” Approach,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 8 (1974) 292-304.

\item Saposnik, R.:
On Transitivity of the Social Preference Relation under Simple Majority
Rule,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 10 (1975) 1-7.

\item Schofield, N.:
Transitivity of Preferences on a Smooth Manifold of Alternatives,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 14 (1977) 149-171.

\item Segal, U.:
Does the Preference Reversal Phenomenon Necessarily Contradict the
Independence Axiom?,
{\em The American Economic Review} 78 (1988) 233-236.

\item Segal, U.:
Order Indifference and Rank-Dependent Probabilities,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 22 (1993) 373-397.

\item Shafer, W.J.:
Preference Relations for Rational Demand Functions,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 11 (1975) 444-455.

\item Shafer, W.:
Revealed Preference Cycles and the Slutsky Matrix,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 16 (1977) 293-309.

\item Shafer, W. and Sonnenschein, H.:
Equilibrium in Abstract Economies without Ordered Preferences,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 2 (1975) 345-348.

\item Shapley, L.S. and Shubik, M.:
Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences,
{\em Econometrica} 34 (1966) 805-827.

\item Smith, B.D.:
Money, Nonconvex Preferences, and the Existence of Equilibrium: A Note,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 32 (1984) 359-366.

\item Subiza, B. and Peris, J.E.:
Numerical Representation for Lower Quasi-Continuous Preferences,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 33 (1997) 149-156.

\item Toranzo, M.E. and Beloso, C.H.:
On the Existence of Continuous Preference Orderings without Utility
Representations,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 24 (1995) 305-309.

\item Vind, K.:
Independence Preferences,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 20 (1991) 119-135.

\item Vind, K.:
von Neumann Morgenstern Preferences,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 33 (2000) 109-122.

\item Weymark, J.A.:
Remarks on the First Welfare Theorem with Nonordered Prefernces,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 36 (1985) 156-159.

\item Yi, G.:
Continuous Extension of Preferences,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 22 (1993) 547-555.

\begin{equation}{\label{h}}\tag{H}\mbox{}\end{equation}

Fuzzy Preferences.

\item Barrette, C.R., Pattanaik, P.K. and Salles, M.:
On Choosing Rationally When Preferences are Fuzzy,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 34 (1990) 197-212.

\item Barrette, C.R., Pattanaik, P.K. and Salles, M.:
Rationality and Aggregation of Preferences in an Ordinally Fuzzy
Framework,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 49 (1992) 9-13.

\item Basu, K.:
Fuzzy Revealed Preference Theory,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 32 (1984) 212-227.

\item Bezdekm J.C. and harris, J.D.:
Fuzzy Partions and Relations: An Axiomatic Basis for Clustering,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 1 (1978) 111-127.

\item Billot, A.:
Aggregation of Preferences: The Fuzzy Case,
{\em Theory and Decision} 30 (1991) 51-93.

\item Dasgupta, M. and Deb, R.:
Transitivity and Fuzzy Preferences,
{\em Social Choice and Welfare} 13 (1996) 305-318.

\item de Baets, B., Van de Walle, B. and Kerre, E.:
Fuzzy Preference Structures without Incomparability,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 76 (1995) 333-348.

\item de Bates, B. and Van de Walle, B.:
Weak and Strong Fuzzy Interval Orders,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 79 (1996) 213-225.

\item Dong, Y., Li, H. and Xu, Y.:
On Reciprocity Indexes in the Aggregation of Fuzzy Preference
Relations Using the OWA Operator,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 159 (2008) 185-192.

\item Dutta, B.:
Fuzzy Preferences and Social Choice,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 13 (1987) 215-229.

\item Dutta, B., Panda, S.C. and Pattanaik, P.K.:
Exact Choice and Fuzzy Preference,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 11 (1986) 53-68.

\item Fodor, J.C.:
Strict Preference Relations Based on Weak t-Norms,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 43 (1991) 327-336.

\item Garc\'{i}a-Lapresta, J.L. and Meneses, L.C.:
Individual-Valued Preferences and Their Aggregation: Consistency Analysis
in a Real Case,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 151 (2005) 269-284.

\item Geslin, S., Salles, M. and Ziad, A.:
Fuzzy Aggregation in Economic Environments I: Quantitative Fuzzines,
Public Goods and Monotonicity Assumptions,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 45 (2003) 155-166.

\item Gheorghe, R., Bufardi, A. and Xirouchakis, P.:
Construction of Global Fuzzy Preference Structures from Two-Parameter
Single-Criterion Fuzzy Outranking Relations,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 153 (2005) 303-330.

\item Haven, E.:
Fuzzy Interval and Semi-Order,
{\em European Journal of Operational Research} 139 (2002) 302-316.

\item Hougaard, J.L. and Keiding, H.:
Representaion of Preferences on Fuzzy Measures by a Fuzzy Integral,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 31 (1996) 1-17.

\item Kacprzyk, J.:
Group Decision Making with a Fuzzy Linguistic Majority,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 18 (1986) 105-118.

\item Kacprzyk, J., Fedrizzi, M. and Nurmi, H.:
Group Decision Making and Consensus under Fuzzy Preferences and Fuzzy
Majority,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 49 (1992) 21-31.

\item Kulshreshtha, P. and Shekar, B.:
Interrelationships among Fuzzy Preference-Based Choice Functions and
Significance of Rationality Conditions: A Taxonomic amd Intuitive
Perspective,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 109 (2000) 429-445.

\item Kundu, S.:
Min-Transitivity of Fuzzy Leftness Relationship and Its Application to
Decision Making,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 86 (1997) 357-367.

\item Kundu, S.:
Similarity Relations, Fuzzy Linear Orders, and Fuzzy Partial Orders,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 109 (2000) 419-428.

\item Lindstr\”{o}m, T.:
A Fuzzy Design of the Willingness to Invest in Sweden,
{\em Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization} 36 (1998) 1-17.

\item Ma, J., Fan, Z.-P., Jiang, Y.-P., Mao, J.-Y. and Ma, L.:
A Method for Repairing the Inconsistency of Fuzzy Preference Relations,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 157 (2006) 20-33.

\item Mesiar, R.:
Fuzzy Set Approach to the Utility, Preference Relations, and Aggregation
Operators,
{\em European Journal of Operational Research} 176 (2007) 414-422.

\item Nakamura, K.:
Preference Relations on a Set of Fuzzy Utilities as a Basis for Decision
Making,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 20 (1986) 147-162.

\item Ovchinnikov, S. and Roubens, M.:
On Strict Preference Relations,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 43 (1991) 319-326.

\item Ovchinnikov, S. and Roubens, M.:
On Fuzzy Strict Preference, Indifference, and Incomparability Relations,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 49 (1992) 15-20.

\item Perny, P. and Roy, B.:
The Use of Fuzzy Outranking Relations in Preference Modelling,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 49 (1992) 33-53.

\item Ponsard, C.:
An Application of Fuzzy Subsets Theory to the Analysis of the Consumer’s
Spatial Preference,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 5 (1981) 235-244.

\item Sengupta, K.:
Fuzzy Preference and Orlovsky Choice Procedure,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 93 (1998) 231-234.

\item Smolyak, S.A.:
Comparison Criteria for Fuzzy Alternatives,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 27 (1994) 185-202.

\item \'{S}witalski, Z.:
Transitivity of Fuzzy Preference Relations — An Empirical Study,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 118 (2001) 503-508.

\begin{equation}{\label{i}}\tag{I}\mbox{}\end{equation}

Social Choice.

\item Armstrong, T.E.:
Precisely Dictatorial Social Welfare Functions,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 14 (1985) 57-59.

\item Baigent, N.:
Anonymity and Continuous Social Choice,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 14 (1985) 1-4.

\item Bandyopadhyay, T.:
On the Frontier between Possibility and Impossibility Theorems in Social
Choice,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 32 (1984) 52-66.

\item Barber\'{a}, S.:
Manipulation of Social Decision Functions,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 15 (1977) 266-278.

\item Barrette, C.R., Pattanaik, P.K. and Salles, M.:
On the Structure of Fuzzy Social Welfare Functions,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 19 (1986) 1-10.

\item Blackorby, C. and Donaldson, D.:
Measures of Relative Equality and Their Meaning in Terms of Social Welfare,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 18 (1978) 59-80.

\item Blau, J.H.:
Semiorders and Collective Choice,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 21 (1979) 195-206.

\item Blau, J.H. and Deb, R.:
Social Decision Functions and the Veto,
{\em Econometrica} 45 (1977) 871-879.

\item Border, K.C.:
Social Welfare Functions for Economic Environments with and without the
Pareto Principle,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 29 (1983) 205-216.

\item Bossert, W.:
Rational Choice and Two-Person Bargaining,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 23 (1994) 549-563.

\item Campbell, D.E.:
Social Choice and Intensity of Preference,
{\em Journal of Political Economy} 81 (1973) 211-219.

\item Campbell, D.E. and Kelly, J.S.:
Lebesgue Measure and Social Choice Trade-Offs,
{\em Economic Theory} 5 (1995) 445-459.

\item Campbell, D.E. and Kelly, J.S.:
Asymptotic Density and Social Choice Trade-offs,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 29 (1995) 181-194.

\item Campbell, D.E. and Kelly, J.S.:
Continuous-Valued Social Choice,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 25 (1996) 195-211.

\item Campbell, D.E. and Kelly, J.S.:
Social Choice Trade-Offs for an Arbitrary Measure: With Application to
Uncertain or Fuzzy Agenda,
{\em Economics Letters} 50 (1996) 99-104.

\item Chichilnisky, G. and Heal, G.:
Community Preferences and Social Choice,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 12 (1983) 33-61.

\item Chipman, J.S. and Moore, J.C.:
On Social Welfare Functions and the Aggregation of Preferences,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 21 (1979) 111-139.

\item Clark, S.A.:
Consistent Choice under Uncertainty,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 14 (1985) 169-185.

\item Danilov, V.I. and Sotskov, A.I.:
On Strongly Consistent Social Choice Functions,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 22 (1993) 327-346.

\item Dasgupta, M. and Deb, R.:
F-Decomposable Social Aggregation Rules and Acyclic Choice,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 23 (1994) 33-44.

\item D\'{a}spremont, C. and Gevers, L.:
Equity and the Informational Basis of Collective Choice,
{\em Review of Economic Studies} 44 (1977) 199-209.

\item Dimitrov, V.:
Group Choice under Fuzzy Information,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 9 (1983) 25-39.

\item Dutta, B.:
Fuzzy Preferences and Social Choice,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 13 (1987) 215-229.

\item Efimov, B.A. and Koshevoy, G.A.:
A Topological Approach to Social Choice with Infinite Populations,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 27 (1994) 145-157.

\item Ellison, G. and Fudenberg, D.:
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning,
{\em Journal of Political Economy} 101 (1993) 612-643.

\item Ferejohn, J.A.:
Decisive Coalitions in the Theory of Social Choice,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 15 (1977) 301-306.

\item Ferejohn, J.A. and Grether, D.M.:
On a Class of Rational Social Decision Procedures,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 8 (1974) 471-482.

\item Ferejohn, J.A. and MnKelvey, R.D.:
Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solution Social Choice Functions: An Impossibility
Theorem,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 29 (1983) 109-119.

\item Fishburn, P.C.:
Lotteries and Social Choices,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 5 (1972) 189-207.

\item Fishburn, P.C. and Gehrlein, W.V.:
Collective Rationality versus Distribution of Power for Binary Social
Choice Functions,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 15 (1977) 72-91.

\item G\”{a}rdenfors, P.:
Manipulation of Social Choice Function,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 13 (1976) 217-228.

\item Hansson, B. and Sahlquist, H.:
A Proof Technique for Social Choice with Variable Electorate,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 13 (1976) 193-200.

\item Herrera, F. and Herrera-Viedma, E.:
Choice Functions and Mechanisms for Linguistic Preference Relations,
{\em European Journal of Operational Research} 120 (2000) 144-161.

\item Holzman, R.:
On Strong Representations of Games by Social Choice Functions,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 15 (1986) 39-57.

\item Howard, J.V.:
A Social Choice Rule and Its Implementation in Perefct Equilibrium,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 56 (1992) 142-159.

\item Ishikawa, S. and Nakamura, K.:
The Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 6 (1979) 283-295.

\item Jamison, D.T. and Lau, L.J.:
Semiorders and the Theory of Choice,
{\em Econometrica} 41 (1973) 901-912.

\item Jewitt, I.:
Risk Aversion and the Choice between Risky Prospects: The Preservation of
Comparative Statics Results,
{\em Review of Economic Studies} 54 (1987) 73-85.

\item John, R. and Ryder, H.E.:
On the Second Optimality Theorem of Welfare Economics,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 36 (1985) 176-185.

\item Kalai, E. and Muller, E.:
Characterization of Domains Admitting Nondictatorial Social Welfare
Functions and Nonmanipulable Voting Procedures,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 16 (1977) 457-469.

\item Kalai, E. and Ritz, V.:
Characterization of the Private Alternatives Domains Admitting Arrow Social
Welfare Functions,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 22 (1980) 23-36.

\item Kaneko, M.:
The Nash Social Welfare Function for a Measure Space of Individuals,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 8 (1981) 173-200.

\item Karni, E. and Safra, Z.:
An Extension of a Theorem of von Neumann and Morgenstern with an
Application to Social Choice Theory,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 34 (2000) 315-327.

\item Kats, A.:
On the Social Welfare Function and the Parameters of Income Distributiin,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 5 (1972) 377-382.

\item Kelly, J.S.:
Social Choice and Computational Complexity,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 17 (1988) 1-8.

\item Kim, J.B.:
Fuzzy Rational Choice Functions,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 10 (1983) 37-43.

\item Kim, K.H. and Roush, F.W.:
Characterization of Certain Choice Functions,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 20 (1979) 271-275.

\item Kim, K.H. and Roush, F.W.:
Binary Social Welfare Functions,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 23 (1980) 416-419.

\item Kraus, M.:
A Comparative Statics: Theorem for Choice under Risk,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 21 (1979) 510-517.

\item Leland, H.:
Information, Managerial Choice and Stockholder Unanimity,
{\em Review of Economic Studies} 45 (1978) 527-534.

\item Lewis, A.A.:
On Effectively Computable Realizations of Choice Functions,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 10 (1985) 43-80.

\item Luo, X.:
A New Approach to Sum-Fuzzy Rational Choice Functions,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 127 (2002) 241-246.

\item Masarani, F. and Gokturk, S.S.:
A Pareto Optimal Characterization of Rawls’ Social Choice Mechanism,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 15 (1986) 157-170.

\item Moulin, H.:
Implementing Efficient, Anonymous and Neutral Social Choice Functions,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 7 (1980) 249-269.

\item Nermuth, M.:
Minimal Conditions for Upper-Hemicontinuity of the Choice Correspondence,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 19 (1978) 558-560.

\item Nagahisa, R.-I.:
Acyclic and Positive Responsive Social Choice with Infinite Individuals,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 22 (1993) 347-358.

\item Ng, D.S.:
Information Accuracy and Social Welfare under Homogeneous Beliefs,
{\em Journal of Financial Economics} 2 (1975) 53-70.

\item Oren, I.:
The Structure of Exactly Strongly Consistent Social Choice Function,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 8 (1981) 207-220.

\item Pan, W.-H.:
A Second Welfare Theorem for Constrained Efficient Allocations in
Incomplete Markets,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 24 (1995) 577-599.

\item Pazner, E.A. and Wesley, E.:
Stability of Social Choices in Infinitely Lareg Societies,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 14 (1977) 252-262.

\item Rader, T.:
The Second Theorem of Welfare Economies when Utilities are Interdependent,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 23 (1980) 420-424.

\item Ritz, Z.:
Restricted Domains, Arrow Social Welfare Functions and Noncorruptible
and Nonmanipulable Social Choice Correspondences: The Case of Private
and Public Alternatives,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 35 (1985) 1-18.

\item Roberts, K.:
Social Choice Rules and Real-Valued Representations,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 29 (1983) 72-94.

\item Rubinstein, A. and Zhou, L.:
Choice Problems with a ‘Reference’ Point,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 37 (1999) 205-209.

\item Samuelson, L.:
On the Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives in Probabilistic Choice
Models,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 35 (1985) 376-389.

\item Sarin, R. and Vahid, F.:
Payoff Assessments without Probabilities: A Simple Dynamic Model of Choice,
{\em Games and Economic Behavior} 28 (1999) 294-309.

\item Sen, A.:
Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions,
{\em Review of Economic Studies} 36 (1969) 381-393.

\item Sen, A.K.:
Choice Functions and Revealed Preference,
{\em Review of Economic Studies} 38 (1971) 307-317.

\item Sen, A.:
Informational Bases of Alternative Welfare Approaches,
{\em Journal of Public Economics} 3 (1974) 387-403.

\item Sen, A.:
Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination,
{\em Econometrica} 45 (1977) 53-87.

\item Sen, M.:
Implementable Social Choice Rules: Characterization and Correspondence
Theorems under Strong Nash Equilibrium,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 11 (1983) 1-24.

\item Strnad, J.:
Full Nash Implementation of Neutral Social Functions,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 16 (1987) 17-37.

\item Suzumura, K.:
Rational Choice and Revealed Preference,
{\em Review of Economic Studies} 43 (1976) 149-158.

\item Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D.:
Rational Choice and the Farming of Decisions,
{\em Journal of Business} 59 (1986) s251-s278.

\item Wilson, R.:
Social Choice Theory without Pareto Principle,
{\em Journal of Economic Theory} 5 (1972) 478-486.

\begin{equation}{\label{j}}\tag{J}\mbox{}\end{equation}

Fuzzy Social Choice.

\item Abdelaziz, F.B., Figueira, J.R. and Meddeb, O.:
On the Manipulability of the Fuzzy Social Choice Functions,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 159 (2008) 177-184.

\item Banerjee, A.:
Fuzzy Preferences and Arrow-Type Problems in Social Choice,
{\em Social Choice and Welfare} 11 (1994) 121-130.

\item Dasgupta, M. and Deb, R.:
Fuzzy Choice Functions,
{\em Social Choice and Welfare} 8 (1991) 171-182.

\item Dutta, B.:
Fuzzy Preferences and Social Choice,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 13 (1987) 215-229.

\item Dutta, B., Panda, S.C. and Pattanaik, P.K.:
Exact Choice and Fuzzy Preference,
{\em Mathematical Social Sciences} 11 (1986) 53-68.

\item Fono, L.A. and Andjiga, N.G.:
Fuzzy Strict Preference and Social Choice,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 155 (2005) 372-389.

\item Fono, L.A., Donfack-Kommogne, V. and Andjiga, N.G.:
Fuzzy Arrow-Type Results without the Pareto Principle Based on Fuzzy Pre-orders,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 160 (2009) 2658-2672.

\item Georgescu, I.:
Degree of Dominance and Congruence Axioms for Fuzzy Choice Functions,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 155 (2005) 390-407.

\item Georgescu, I.:
Acyclic Rationality Indicators of Fuzzy Choice Functions,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 160 (2009) 2673-2685.

\item Kulshreshtha, P. and Shekar, B.:
Interrelationships among Fuzzy Preference-Based Choice Functions and Significance of Rationality Conditions: A Taxonomic amd Intuitive Perspective,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 109 (2000) 429-445.

\item Richardson, G.:
The Structure of Fuzzy Preferences: Social Choice Implications,
{\em Social Choice and Welfare} 15 (1998) 359-369.

\item Sengupta, K.:
Fuzzy Preference and Orlovsky Choice Procedure,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 93 (1998) 231-234.

\item Wang, X,:
A Note on Convergence Conditions of Fuzzy Choice Functions,
{\em Fuzzy Sets and Systems} 145 (2004) 355-358.

\begin{equation}{\label{k}}\tag{K}\mbox{}\end{equation}

Computational Economics.

\item Duffy, J.:
Learning to Speculate: Experiments with Artificial and Real Agents,
{\em Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control} 25 (2001) 295-319.

\item Kirman, A.P. and Vriend, N.J.:
Evolving Market Structure: An ACE Model of Price Dispersion and Loyalty,
{\em Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control} 25 (2001) 459-502.

\item Srikant, R. and Basar, T.:
Iterative Computation of Noncooperative Equilibria in Nonzero-Sum
Differential Games with Weakly Coupled Players,
{\em Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications} 71 (1991) 137-168.

\item Richter, M.K. and Wong, K.-C.:
Computable Preference and Utility,
{\em Journal of Mathematical Economics} 32 (1999) 339-354.

\item Tesfatsion, L.:
Introduction to the Special Issue on Agent-Based Computational Economics,
{\em Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control} 25 (2001) 281-293.

\item Tesfatsion, L.:
Structure, Behavior, and Market Power in an Evolutionary Labor
Market with Adaptive Search,
{\em Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control} 25 (2001) 419-457.

\item Velupillai, K.:
Expository Notes on Computability and Complexity in Games,
{\em Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control} 21 (1997) 955-979.

\item Wilson, R.:
Computing Simply Stable Equilibria,
{\em Econometrica} 60 (1992) 1039-1070.